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Abstract 
In this paper the question is addressed asking, “Is Timeshare Ownership an Investment 
Product?” After some discussion, the conclusion is that the purchaser outlays funds for economic 
benefit, thus timeshare fits well within the definition of an investment product.  The paper also adds 
to the literature in that it advances the discussion regarding the risks associated with timeshare and 
the methodology applied in timeshare valuation. As investment is based on the notion of risk and 
return, thus firstly the risks associated with timeshare are discussed. Following, an analysis is 
conducted from a consumer’s perspective considering the viability of investing in timeshare versus 
that of simply renting a holiday unit for one week per year. The notion that the purchase of 
timeshare can lock-in at least a portion of vocation expenses to today’s rates is tested. The case is 
based on real figures taken from an offer made on a particular timeshare resort from a popular 
timeshare location and tourist destination. The viability from an economic perspective of investing 
in these timeshare investments was not supported by the analysis. The scenario that a capital gain 
could make up the shortfall was considered, but it was demonstrated that this was not probable in 
the cases presented.  
Based on the cases discussed, there are three aspects highlighted in the paper as contributing 
to the costs of ownership of timeshare that are considered as factors that could be addressed to make 
timeshare ownership a more feasible purchase. They are the cost of sales, maintenance costs and 
exit costs. If the industry were able to take up the challenge of reducing these costs in particular, it 
is likely that investment in timeshare would be more feasible and attract a wider market. 
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Introduction 
Timesharing is the general name for the purchase of a condominium in a shared recreational 
resort for a prescribed interval of time. An interval is purchased at a timeshare resort, and represents 
a portion, typically a week’s interval, purchased in a condominium. Thus each unit of a timeshare 
resort is divided into intervals, either by week or by a point equivalent. The traditional concept of 
timesharing is the purchase of the use of a property for a period of one week or more during a given 
year. Under this style of purchase, the member owns their portion of the holiday unit for the time 
they plan to use it, and could receive a deed for that portion of the property (1). However, more 
flexible products are becoming popular. The concept is promoted as an alternative and, as a means 
of hedging against, the rising costs of holiday accommodation. The weeks’, periods or points are 
sold for a one-off purchase price and the owners have access to holiday accommodation reserved 
for their use. The purchase price depends on features including: the size, location, amenities, and 
the season in which the condominium will be used. An annual fee covers maintenance and 
management of the property. However, there are many variations on this and a wide variety of 
different benefits offered to owners. Some of these will be discussed in the following sections. 
The timeshare market has seen considerable growth and is developing as an industry globally 
(see Figure 1). Given its growth and potential, it is surprising that there has not been a lot of 
attention paid to the analysis of timesharing. There has been little discussion within the context of 
timeshare ownership as an investment product. Within this context, an important question is as to 
whether timeshare is a security. For the practitioner, this is central to the requirements as to the 
information that is not to be provided to the consumer. From the perspective of consumer 
protection, the matter has ramifications as to what information is presented to the consumer. 
From an economic perspective, aspects such as the risks associated with and valuation of a 
timeshare purchase are important considerations. Timeshare valuation has been addressed by two 
prior studies. Ragas (2) applies a discounting cash flow model for timeshare valuation which 
estimates the net present value of expected after-tax cash flows. The analysis is founded on the 
notion that a substitute for a timeshare condominium is a hotel room. This notion is contestable as it 
could be soundly argued that an identical condominium in the same complex is a far superior 
substitute. Establishments that have identical condominiums available for holiday rental and 
timeshare ownership are relatively common; hence, figures are readily available for analysis. This 
then alleviates the need for the many assumptions and calculations in the Ragas model. The 
adjustments for the different levels of facilities and the “food savings” in the analysis make it 
cumbersome. Especially considering that substitutes are available, rendering such complexity 
unnecessary. Ziobrowski (3) presents a simplified discounting cash flow model for timeshare 
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valuation based on readily available variables. The model is more plausible in that it takes similar 
rental properties as substitutes and applies the ‘actual “rent available” and operating costs 
associated with the timeshare property being priced’ (3, p 372). The major flaw of the approach is 
the argument that it is a risk-free investment. There are quite a number of risks that a purchaser 
faces in timeshare, which are detailed in this study, demonstrating that it should not be evaluated 
using a risk-free discount rate. The other flaw in the Ziobrowski approach is the high resale value 
applied. Whilst high resale values may be applicable in some circumstances, it does not appear to be 
the case generally, especially after some time has elapsed. On observation the secondary market is 
not active and typically provides low resale prices. The models proposed in this study follows the 
essence of the Ziobrowski approach, but applies a theoretically sound discount rate and more 
realistic resale values, assuming that the purchaser holds timeshare for at least ten years. 
 
The History of Timeshare 
The concept of timesharing is said to have come into being in France in the 1960s when a 
group of European holidaymakers decided that, as the cost of accommodation was so high in their 
beloved French Alps, and as they could not afford to purchase their own individual holiday villas, 
they would combine their finances to jointly purchase and share the costs and privileges of 
ownership of a beautiful deluxe villa. The project located near St. Etienne-en-Devoluy, was 
commenced in 1967 and was called “Superdevoluy High Alps”. Each participant planned to enjoy 
the use of the villa for a pre-agreed, pre-determined period each year. From this humble beginning 
the timeshare industry was born (4). 
In the 1960s and 70s the concept began to spread internationally as consumers in Florida, 
United States, and in other countries, began to embrace timeshare (5). Even though from the outset 
marketing the concept was a challenge (6), the industry has experienced significant growth. 
Presently, around 5,000 timeshare resorts are to be found in 110 countries worldwide (see Figure 1). 
Almost half of these resorts are in the US which has more than 3 million timeshare owners. Europe, 
with 750,000 owners and more than 1,800 resorts is second to the US in timeshare ownership (7). 
Worldwide sales of timeshare topped US$7.7 billion in 2000 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Global Sales and Owners 
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Source: American Resort Development Association (8) 
The Timeshare Industry 
The timeshare industry prides itself in that it creates jobs, promotes tourism and assists 
economies to grow. In the US alone it employed over 50,000 people in 1999. Indirectly the industry 
contributed approximately 220,000 jobs, and its input into the US economy reached US$18 billion 
(1). The industry has experienced solid growth of around 1000% in the past 20 years (1). Industry 
players believe the future is bright and that growth will continue (9, 10). 
Particularly during the developmental stages of the industry, timeshare suffered a perception 
of poor credibility shaped by a negative reputation in many parts of the world. This was not helped 
by the aggressive marketing techniques and dubious financial practices promoted by some players. 
Wild claims were made in some instances as to the value of the investment and the prospect of 
expected returns that were never actually realized (11). Hence, in many parts of the world, codes of 
practice or regulations prevent timeshare being sold as an investment product. 
Various measures have been aimed at helping timeshare overcome the negative perceptions, 
gain greater credibility, and improve its reputation and acceptability. This has also been enhanced 
by the involvement of brand-name hospitality companies such as Disney, Embassy Suites, Four 
Seasons, Hampton, Hilton, Hilton, Holiday, Hyatt, Marriott, Radisson, Ramada, Ritz-Carlton, 
Starwood, and Westin (12, 13). The formation of timeshare industry associations with strict codes 
of practice has also been a significant catalyst for change and improved credibility. Unfortunately 
however, despite these efforts, in some countries the industry is still plagued by aggressive 
marketing techniques and dubious claims which tarnish its reputation. 
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Types of timeshare schemes 
The primary types of timeshare are categorised as fixed, floating, and points schemes. The 
fixed week timeshare scheme is where the same week every year is owned at the members 
timeshare resort. It is the most common form of timeshare (Figure 2). The floating week scheme is 
where the member does not have a fixed week, but rather is able to select the week of choice each 
year on a first-in preference basis. This could be any time of year (floating – annual), or it could be 
for a particular season only (floating – seasonal) (Figure 2). The points timeshare schemes are very 
flexible and refers to where points are redeemed for daily or weekend stays. Usually more points 
are required for weekends and the high seasons. Most schemes offer membership of exchange 
schemes that, for a fee, allows the timeshare owner to exchange into other resorts worldwide. 
Figure 2: Types of Conveyancing, 1998 
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Source: American Resort Development Association (8). 
 
The demand for flexibility has driven the development of a variety of timeshare schemes. For 
instance, there are point-based programs, vacation clubs, undivided interests as well as deeded, 
right-to-use, leasehold agreements. Vacation clubs and points schemes are non-deeded 
arrangements and are gaining popularity due to the flexibility they offer. These schemes facilitate 
the opportunity to visit various destinations across the world, and benefit from equivalent quality 
accommodation that is typically offered. Consumers should be aware however that some schemes 
provide less consumer protection than others. For example, in the EU a cooling-off period does not 
always apply for holiday clubs, whereas it does on timeshare purchases (14). 
Note: This is the most recent industry data available. 
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Figure 3: Types of Conveyancing, 1998 
85%
10%
4%1%
Deeded/Fee-simple Right-to-use Points Other
 
Source: American Resort Development Association (8). 
 
There are also some variations of the original timeshare scheme. Firstly, the title based 
schemes. Under a title based scheme each timeshare purchaser receives an interest in the property 
that is determined by the number of intervals owned. Secondly, share based schemes in which a 
public company is established by the developer. The property is then transferred to the company. 
Shares representing the various types of accommodation are then sold in the company. Thirdly, the 
unit trust scheme is where the buyer acquires a unit in the trust. In this scheme the buyer has no 
direct control over the manager as they do in title-based scheme. The terms of the constitution 
govern the right of use of the timeshare interval. Finally, the right to use or share schemes. In the 
right to use schemes the timeshare owner does not acquire any permanent interest in the underlying 
property either directly or indirectly. Simply the right to use the property for certain periods is 
purchased by the member. 
Legislation and Regulation 
The timeshare industry is typically highly regulated in most countries, and in some by both 
federal and state laws. This has been brought about as a result of particularly consumer protection 
concerns. It is principally a response to high-pressure sales and marketing practices and a concern 
for the unethical and/or deceptive practices used by some operators (1). Timeshare operators in 
some countries such as the US and Australia face considerable regulation. Whereas timeshare 
operations in the European Union typically do not face the same level of regulation (5), although 
added regulation is presently being explored. Increasing the difficulties faced by the timeshare 
industry, regulations usually vary considerably between countries, and even from state to state 
within some countries.  
Note: This is the most recent industry data available. 
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All in all, many laws and regulations may apply. By way of illustration, Marriott faces up to 
50 compliance and regulatory issues in some situations when it enters the timeshare market (5). 
Being highly regulated adds considerably to the cost of timeshare overall and adds to the difficulties 
faced in marketing the product. 
The Approach Used by the Timeshare Industry 
In most cases in regulated markets timeshare is sold as a consumer product. It is not sold as an 
investment and no financial advice is given. This has both a positive and negative consequence. The 
positive side is that it forbids unscrupulous sales personnel making outrageous claims, and 
promoting the idea that a return can be gained from the investment. The industry bodies and 
legislators in many countries do make a considerable effort to reign in the unethical behaviour of 
unprincipled organisations and salespersons. The negative side is that an accurate cost benefit 
analysis is not provided nor encouraged to be conducted by the purchaser. Sales staff are not 
required to provide investment advice, and accurate figures as to expected returns (or otherwise) are 
not provided. This may open the consumer to the salesperson speaking in glowing terms and 
appealing to the emotions, rather than presenting and being accountable for investment advice. The 
economic benefits or disadvantages associated with the ownership of timeshare is not offered. 
Income or cash flow projections, or tax advantages or impacts are not included in materials. As this 
information is not required, it does reduce consumer protection considerably. Thus with regard to 
consumer protection, this is both good and bad. It forbids unprincipled sales personnel from 
overstating the investment possibility, but on the other hand it allows the marketing of timeshare 
without any form of cost benefit analysis, investment advice or accountability and limits consumer 
protection.  
It is evident that there is still a problem in some countries where unscrupulous operators sell 
timeshare. The timeshare industry continues to find itself under the scrutiny of the media and under 
the watchful eye of regulators. Though industry bodies and legislators in many countries do make a 
considerable effort to reign in the unethical behaviour, high-pressure sales tactics, and deceitful 
claims and actions of unprincipled organisations and salespersons. The image of the industry is not 
helped by headlines splashed across the pages, web sites and news bulletins, of the mass media. Yet 
from time to time unscrupulous individuals or operators do attract the attention of industry 
watchdogs and the media. Their actions do not help the image of the industry.  
Is Timeshare Ownership an Investment Product? 
Timeshare schemes are commonly referred to as lifestyle products in the industry and thus are 
not actually considered an investment by many in the timeshare sector. Many in the timeshare 
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industry vigorously oppose categorising timeshare as a security. Some courts in the US have ruled 
that timeshare is not a security when the purpose of the purchase is for lodging and is contracted 
accordingly (15). However, timeshare is categorised as a security in some jurisdictions globally. For 
example, in Australia timeshare is categorized as a managed fund by the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (Corporations Act 2001, sec. 601FB(1)). The Responsible Entity, the 
organisation running the scheme, must also hold a security dealers licence and sales staff must also 
pass exams and hold a certificate. Thus, there is a significant question then that matters to 
consumers, the industry and regulators alike. That is the question, “is timeshare ownership an 
investment product?”  
Firstly, from an economic perspective the purchaser outlays funds with the expectation that 
the price of holiday accommodation for the future will be fixed. This is the economic benefit of the 
purchase. Thus there is an investment for an economic benefit and it is therefore reasonable to 
consider it a consumer investment product. From a securities perspective, as such, it could be 
classified as a managed investment security. So the original question leads to the question, “does it 
fit the category of a managed investment security?” A security is a financial asset or paper right to 
an asset, which is generally considered transferable or tradable. Examples of such financial assets or 
papers are bills of exchange, bonds, and stocks. This is in contrast to real assets such as real estate, 
cash or gold. An investment is any asset purchased for the purpose of producing, benefit, income or 
capital gains. A pooled investment is an investment in which a number of individual investors place 
funds that are pooled, and as a total the pooled funds are invested in an asset(s). A professional 
manager administers the investment for the benefit of the investors or to produce a return. A 
managed investment scheme is similar in that the pooled funds of individuals are placed in the 
hands of a professional manager with a mutual investment strategy or objective as the motivating 
force (16, 17). They allow investors to gain access to markets and products that would otherwise be 
out of reach for the individual small investor. The two main benefits of managed investments are 
the opportunity to pool funds to achieve a mutual objective and to utilize experienced management 
to administer it. 
Under a title-based timeshare scheme each purchaser invests in and receives an interest in a 
property that is determined by the number of intervals (or weeks) owned. The funds of investors are 
pooled and invested in an asset, namely the timeshare property. The investor receives an interest in 
the property. It is thus almost identical to a managed investment scheme in that the pooled funds of 
individuals are placed in the hands of a professional manager with a mutual investment objective as 
the motivating force. In this case an investment is made with the objective of purchasing a share of 
the property in order to provide lodging and in the belief that it will hedge against increases in 
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future holiday accommodation. Thus, timeshare certainly fits well within the category of a managed 
investment scheme. Similarly, timesharing is a type of unit trust. If it fits the definition of a security 
and a managed investment, it is reasonable to consider it as an investment product under that 
category. 
In consideration of the question as to whether timeshare ownership could be considered an 
investment product, the finding of this section is that it reasonable to consider timeshare an 
investment product. There is an outlay of funds by the purchaser with the expectation of economic 
benefit – that of fixing the price of holiday accommodation for the future. Inventors’ funds are 
pooled and invested in an asset that is managed by a professional manager for the financial benefit 
of the investors, thus it is in practice a managed investment product. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
non financial benefits are derived from the purchase of timeshare, from an economic perspective, it 
fits as a managed investment product. 
 
Analysis as an Investment Product 
There are two significant aspects to be considered with any investment product. These are the 
risks involved and the expected returns. Financial theory holds that inventors should be rewarded by 
way of adequate returns for the risks taken in any particular investment. Inventors that are risk 
averse may deposit their funds with an intermediary such as a deposit taking institution, which in 
turn pools the funds and invests them for a return. In so doing the intermediary takes most of the 
risk and the returns for the depositors are low. For example, a bank takes the savings of individuals, 
pools them and makes the investments, and bares most of the risk. If an investor desires a higher 
return they would typically have to bear greater risk. This may mean that they might invest in a 
pooled fund that invests in more risky assets and does not have the same checks and balances that 
are required by regulators of banks. Alternatively if an investor was less risk averse still, they may 
take on greater risk and invest directly in the market. The later would expect to be rewarded for the 
greater risk with higher returns. Thus, the greater the risk, the higher return that a rational investor 
would expect. 
Given that investors should consider and be aware of the risks associated with an investment 
and be rewarded for taking the risk, then if we were to consider timeshare as an investment, what 
are the risks involved in timeshare and what returns could an investor expect? This question is 
addressed in the following sections. Furthermore, in the Ziobrowski (3) model for valuing timeshare 
considered later, a risk-free discount rate is applied. Thus there is also the question as to whether 
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timeshare is free of risk and therefore the question as to if a risk-free discount rate is applicable. 
Theoretically, a risk-free rate should only by applied to a risk free investment. 
 
The Risks Associated with a Timeshare Investment 
The risks associated with any purchase should be considered, especially when comparing 
investment opportunities. Theoretically an inventor should be rewarded for the risk borne. There is 
also the question associated with valuing timeshare as to whether the risk-free discount rate is 
appropriate. In this section some of the typical risks of timeshare are analysed and discussed. Those 
considered most important are outlined below. 
According to a study conducted in 1999, 13% of timeshare owners are dissatisfied with their 
purchase (5). Baumann (18) list three primary reasons owners divest their vacation intervals: an 
empty-nest situation, unexpected financial difficulties or the owner never fully used the interval. 
Many of these owners may sell if they could get a fair price. Within this context, a risk that is 
considered as high in timeshare schemes is that of liquidity risk (see Table 1). Liquidity refers to the 
ease with which a security or asset can be converted to cash. Accordingly, in the context of 
timeshare, it is the risk associated with the capacity of a consumer to sell a timeshare investment 
quickly and at a fair price. If an owner is required to reduce the price below market value or fair 
value, or takes considerable time or expense to divest the investment, then it is considered illiquid. 
For example if the asset is cash, it is generally very liquid, whereas real estate may be somewhat 
less liquid or illiquid depending on the state of the economy and the demand for the property. 
Liquidity risk is thus the risk that the investment will be illiquid. Thus, based on this definition, 
timeshare can generally be considered as illiquid and to face liquidity risk. 
Liquidity is very much dependent on the demand for the asset and on an active secondary 
market. In contrast to timeshare, there is an active secondary market for equity held in companies. 
Stock exchanges provide a relatively liquid means of trading shares in firms. However, there is no 
such organised secondary market for timeshare. So generally, if an investor wishes to sell 
timeshare, it is difficult to find a buyer and sales are in the main transacted at significant reductions 
from the price paid (19). In some countries, such as Australia, the risk that the purchaser might not 
receive the full purchase price is required to be stated in the prospectus or sales documentation. The 
ability to sell timeshare over the internet in on-line auctions, such as Ebay (20) will surely enhance 
its liquidity. It may be in the best interests of the industry to promote the secondary market, as an 
increase in liquidity should buoy the confidence of purchasers and increase prices on the secondary 
market. 
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Another risk that is considered as high in timeshare schemes is marketability risk (see Table 
1). It is somewhat similar to liquidity risk and is the risk that a future market will not exist for an 
asset or investment. If for example a market contracts due to an economic slowdown or if consumer 
confidence declines, it will reduce the marketability of an asset or investment as a result of the lack 
of buyers in the market and increase marketability risk.  
Liquidity and marketability are very much interrelated and are significant risks in the 
ownership of timeshare. If an owner wished to sell their timeshare asset, it would often be difficult 
to find a purchaser interested in buying it at a reasonable price.  
Market volatility risk is noted as low for timeshare products in Table 1. Market volatility risk 
is the risk that the market will be volatile and rise or fall sharply within a short period of time. In 
general, volatility is a statistical measure of the rise and fall of a market or security. On the other 
hand, it is shown as high for common stock. Stockmarkets are considered particularly volatile 
during periods of economic uncertainty especially. Whereas, real estate is typically less volatile 
since price movements and indiscriminate selling is uncommon (see Table 1). Though timeshare 
resale prices are low, as discussed previously, they are not volatile and are reasonably predictable. 
Thus, market volatility risk is low. 
 
Table 1: The Likelihood of a Risk Impacting on Various Investment Products 
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Adapted from: Garman 1985 and 2000. (21, 22) 
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There are various aspects of business risk that are worthy of comment, since timeshare 
business risk is noted in Table 1 as medium. Business risk is the risk of a major unexpected 
deterioration in a firm’s business. In particular, there is a risk that the required number of 
participants to make the scheme economically viable is not attained. The capacity to market 
timeshare is subject to many constraints, not the least of which are the perceptions in the market. If 
sales do not progress as well as expected, it can take many years for all units or fractions of 
timeshare to be sold. This in turn may lead to escalating capital costs, which increases the financial 
distress and can put at risk the viability of the project which may in turn increase counterparty risk. 
There is a risk that maintenance, operational or other levies of the timeshare scheme may 
increase. These levies are normally contractually payable by the timeshare members annually. 
Increases in costs associated with operations or maintenance will of course be passed on to 
members, though some constitutions limit these increases. However there is a risk that future 
increases would make timeshare membership economically unviable for the consumer. Some 
operators have been known to subsidise the levies during the selling stage. A consequence being 
that members face increases in levies after the sales team pulls out and the subsidies removed. 
An additional aspect is that of a loss of or failure to recruit quality staff. This is complicated 
since labour resources are often stretched as timeshare usually operates in tourism or resort areas 
(5). The timeshare scheme is reliant upon experienced and capable management and staff. Overall 
in any service industry, superior staff is a primary key to gaining and sustaining sustainable 
strategic advantage (23). Staffing issues and especially the loss of quality key staff could have a 
considerable bearing on the operation of the scheme and thus poses a significant risk to timeshare 
members. 
Political risk should also be considered in any venture, but is a relatively low risk in timeshare 
schemes in most developed countries (see Table 1). Political risk is not only the risk associated with 
insurrection or political corruption or misappropriation, it is also the risk of politically driven 
changes will alter the playing field for business. Typically it is coupled with the recurrent changes 
in government or in government policy, such as taxation or monetary and fiscal policy. Along the 
same lines is the risk of legislative and regulatory changes. Any changes in these domains may 
impact upon the way in which the timeshare scheme operates. This risk is considerably higher for 
timeshare operators, as it is a developing market which has come under the scrutiny of legislators 
and regulators from time to time. However, in the current political arena in which consumer 
protection is in the spotlight, any changes are likely to benefit the consumer and thus be positive for 
timeshare purchasers. So the primary risk is to the developers rather than the consumer directly. 
However, risks faced by developers may have a flow-on effect to investors. It should be noted that 
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the industry has a strong industry network and industry bodies in most developed countries, which 
work tirelessly at protecting the industry from adverse influences from any threats. Unfortunately, 
this may not be the case in less developed economies or within countries that have high political 
risk. 
The next risk to be considered, that of defaulting members of the scheme, is a counterparty 
risk and is a medium risk (see Table 1). In any business cash flow is the all-important element that 
will make it viable and sustainable (6). If a substantial proportion of members defaulted it could put 
the operation at risk and lead to escalating financial distress. If the operation were already facing a 
level of financial distress due to defaulting members, outside pressures or any other reason, an 
escalation of members defaulting would increase the risk. A reduction in cash flow could result in 
the funds required for on-going expenses being affected and the flow-on affect of the reserve fund 
account being reduced to dangerously low levels. Typically the constitution or legislation addresses 
the possibility of defaulting members who would normally forfeit their timeshare interest after 
certain due process is followed. Defaulting members may lead to added loss of revenue and 
increased costs, especially by way of marketing expenses, as the interest must then be resold.  
There are a number of reasons why members may default. It could be brought about by a 
downturn in the economy overall or personal financial distress impacting upon the capacity of 
members to maintain their obligations. It could also be brought on by overall dissatisfaction of a 
member or worse a group of members. For example, if there were an increasing levies that members 
perceived as unjustified, they may choose to default. Additionally, a perceived reduced level of 
service, quality, maintenance, holiday experience or confidence in management is also likely to 
result in defaulting members. Thus a reduction in perceived levels of satisfaction of members or 
their guests for whatever reason is a risk to be considered. As a considerable portion of a holiday 
experience for timeshare members is service related and intangible, managing these aspects 
skilfully is vital to the ongoing success of timeshare ownership. Any deterioration in aspects valued 
by members or that contribute to their holiday experience could result in a downturn in business and 
therefore poses a risk to all members (24). Characteristic features that may contribute to the holiday 
experience include the overall quality, ambiance, aesthetics, neighbourhood, facilities, 
entertainment, shopping, transport, catering, food, or even other fellow members. Within this 
context not the least of considerations is the management and staff as they play a very significant 
part in the perceived level of service, which is also intangible (25). All staff impact enormously on 
creating an enjoyable, and happy holiday experience. Due to the flow on affect the quality of all 
levels of management in particularly plays an important part in creating a pleasant holiday 
experience. For example the dress, attitude, personality, character, and communication and 
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interpersonal skills impacts on the perceived level of service. Consequently any change within the 
working environment can have significant consequences. There are measures taken to minimise 
these risks in most situations as the risk to the business as a whole is well recognised. Thus 
generally management and staff are carefully selected to avoid such problems. The role of brand-
name organisations and the reputation that they are protecting also plays an important role in 
maintaining standards. 
Severe financial distress as discussed above or as a result of an economic downturn or other 
factors could ultimately result in a further counterparty risk being realised. That is the risk that the 
operator of the timeshare scheme becomes insolvent and ceases to operate. It could thus result in the 
loss of the benefits enjoyed by the timeshare members and the loss of the funds invested. Of all the 
risks, this is of course has the most severe consequences but is noted in Table 1 as a medium risk.  
Exchange programs and affiliation agreements are found by many purchasers of timeshare to 
be one of the most attractive reasons for making the purchase. Exchanges and affiliations provide a 
global channel for timeshare members to be able to exchange their rights for the right to use other 
condominiums and resort facilities in timeshare resorts available through the affiliation or an 
exchange company. This is naturally subject to availability and the service is provided for a fee. 
However, there is a risk associated with this in that these arrangements are not guaranteed and can 
change at any time. Thus purchasers’ could find themselves unable to access the facilities that were 
considered advantageous to them when the decision to purchase timeshare was made. As this risk is 
not common to other investments it is not listed in Table 1. 
There is also the risk associated with demand for a timeshare unit, which is influence by the 
quality and location of the property and the season allocated. There is not a great deal of demand for 
a property that is not at a popular holiday destination or that is poorly situated or maintained. Even 
if the property overall is in demand, there may not be demand for an out of season week. High 
season weeks in a high demand property are more expensive to purchase, so some consumers 
purchase the cheaper less demand resorts or seasons. The risk is that the condominium purchased is 
in a location that no one wishes to exchange with or in a week that is not popular or not wanted at 
all. Two risks are associated with this. Firstly, the impact of the demand on exchanges. If a low 
demand timeshare unit is purchased it may be found that exchanges are not available now or later 
when the popularity diminishes. Second is resale risk, in that demand for a timeshare unit is 
governed by the attributes and position of the property and the allocated season. The demand 
impacts upon the resale value, its marketability and the time it takes to sell the property in the resale 
market. Furthermore, as timeshare becomes more flexible in its offerings, it is exposed more and 
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more to similar factors as those that impact upon the tourism and lodging industry such as seasonal 
factors, weather conditions and issues concerning the transport and aviation industry. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the risks involved in timeshare is that it 
is not a risk free investment. As with many other investments, there are quite a number of risks that 
an investor should consider before making the investment. These risks should also be considered in 
relation to the return of the investment. As mentioned previously the greater the risk the higher 
return that a rational investor would expect. In the following section the possible returns are 
determined, analysed and discussed. Furthermore, it is thus concluded that a risk-free rate is not 
applicable as the discount rate to be applied in the analysis of timeshare as applied by Ziobrowski 
(3). 
 
Analysis of the Returns on a Timeshare Investment  
The analysis of the value of timeshare is based on the benefits derived from the investment. 
Ultimately the discount rate and thus the required return on a timeshare investment is determined in 
part by the risks associated with the investment as outlined above. However, it is difficult to 
specifically quantify the risks and thus it is somewhat of a challenge to determine a suitable 
required return. Nevertheless, it is posited that a property market index provides a reasonably proxy. 
In this section this is considered and discussed and an analysis is conducted of examples of 
investments in timeshare.  
The analysis is conducted considering the viability of investing in timeshare versus that of 
simply renting a holiday unit for one week per year. The case used is a well-selected representative 
example and is based on real figures taken from an offer made on a particular timeshare property 
based on the Gold Coast in Queensland, Australia, a popular timeshare location and tourist 
destination. Whilst this may appear limited, fifteen offerings were analysed and a representative 
case was chosen as it was considered a typical representative example in this market. In the primary 
case the price per timeshare unit per week is AUD19,500 and annual maintenance fees are AUD440 
per unit per week. Ziobrowski (3) applies a rate of return of 5% annually in that a timeshare 
purchase is assumed to be relatively risk-free. Assuming this rather conservative opportunity cost of 
5% per annum compounding monthly, if the person were to invest the AUD19,500 for ten years, it 
would have earned a total of AUD30,556 over ten years. The present annual rate for maintenance 
fees that the timeshare owner is required to pay is AUD440. Assuming an inflation rate of 3% per 
annum as applied by Ziobrowski, over ten years the owner of timeshare would expect to pay a total 
of AUD5,044 in maintenance fees. Accordingly, the sum total of the investment comes to 
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AUD37,161 after ten years. This is assuming the timeshare owner pays no other levies and does not 
holiday anywhere else, which would incur further costs. It also assumes the owner has not funded 
the purchase with borrowings, in which case, the cost of debt should also be factored in. 
Holiday rental prices for identical units in the same resort were AUD1,365 per week for the 
same season. Thus presuming a holiday is taken annual for one week and applying an inflation rate 
of 3% per annum the outlay totals AUD13,241 over ten years, which is the as the economic benefit 
of owning timeshare. After ten years with the total investment in timeshare is AUD37,161, 
compared to holiday rental expenses of AUD13,241. The difference is AUD23,920. At today’s 
value or present value this is a AUD14,685 difference. Thus clearly considerable more is outlay in 
timeshare ownership. 
An investment in real estate may be expected to provide capital gain returns by some 
investors that may make up this difference. However, a quick estimate demonstrates that in this 
instance it is unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. Taking the present timeshare cost of 
AUD19,500 per week and multiplying it by fifty-two, being the weeks of a year, the present cost of 
a condominium in total is AUD1,014,000. However, the average offer price for similarly situated 
two-bedroom units presently on the market in the facility is AUD353,000. Thus, based on this 
figure, a per-unit-week is currently worth approximately AUD6,788 or a little less, remembering 
that this is the asking price and the final sale price may be lower. That is approximately 35% of the 
AUD19,500 per week for a timeshare unit. Evidently, a capital gain is not likely to be realised for 
quite a while, if at all. 
In consideration of capital gains potential, the average of conservative capital growth 
estimates from five real estate agents from this particular area in question is presently 8% per 
annum. After a number of years of steady growth in the geographic region, capital gains growth has 
picked up in the last couple of years and is expected to level back out to a steady growth of around 
8%, though of course this is not at all certain. Thus, assuming a capital growth of 8% in the region 
and factoring in maintenance fees, it would take at least 13.3 years for the overall value of the unit 
to appreciate to the approximate breakeven point of AUD1,014,000 based on these assumptions. 
Nevertheless, the fittings, furniture and buildings would depreciate which has not been factored in. 
However, it is assumed that some of the depreciation will be alleviated by maintenance funded by 
the maintenance levy.  
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Analysis of Timeshare as an Investment 
In a number of jurisdictions it is forbidden to sell timeshare as an investment. The primary 
reason is that a major selling point has been that timeshare is a good investment. This sounds 
plausible to consumers but often simply does not add up as in the example provided above. The 
associated costs are simply too high for any capital gain that may be enjoyed by the real estate 
component to make up in a reasonable time horizon. Thus because of the high costs involved it 
simply does not cut as a viable investment security that would meet the required return of astute 
investors. However, many have been convinced that timeshare does make a good ecenomic 
investment by unscrupulous sales personnel and marketing campaigns. A quick search of the 
internet even today reveals operators touting timeshare units as a worthwhile investment. 
A major selling point that has been used by timeshare marketing is that “investing” the 
purchase price today will fix your holiday costs into the future at today’s rates. This can be tested as 
to its viability using a NPV analysis. Following the lines of the Ragas (1986) and Ziobrowski 
(1997) models (2, 3) the following formula is used to determine the net present value of the 
timeshare purchase: 
 NPV = Cash Benefit - ICO + PVRSP  (1) 
Where Cash Benefit = Rent Saved – Maintenance Fee. Rent Saved is the current weekly 
rental rate of an identical unit, adjusted annually for inflation. It represents the holiday rental fees 
that are saved by the owner of a timeshare property because they have the use of one week in a 
timeshare condominium. This assumes that timeshare units are competitively priced to equivalent 
units in close proximity in the same facility to non-timeshare units. The Maintenance Fee represents 
the current annual maintenance fee that applies per week per unit, adjusted for inflation annually. 
ICO is the initial cash outlay per timeshare unit and PVRSP is the present value of the after-tax 
resale proceeds. Resales are typically made at significant discount of 50% or even 80% of the 
original price (26). Resale’s for timeshare in this vicinity, which are no longer being marketed by a 
developer and are thus exposed to the timeshare resale market, are listed with a timeshare sales 
agent at AUD3,820 which is approximately a 68% discount from the original sale price of 
AUD12,000. Given that they do actually sell at this price and applying brokerage and transaction 
costs of 20% (6), the final return to the timeshare owner would be approximately 75.4% discount of 
the original sale price in this case. Assuming the possibility of the resale value being higher for 
popular weeks of a popular resort, a discount of at 50% is also applied. Accordingly, in this analysis 
two values are used for analysis purposes – 75.4% and 50%. 
The relationship between expected inflation and interest rates can be expressed as (27): 
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 (1+r)  =  N  (2) 
Where r is the nominal interest rate, NLVWKHUHDOLQWHUHVWUDWHDQG LVWKHH[SHFWHGLQIODWLRQ
rate. Thus, to determine the real required rate of return for the NPV analysis, the following formula 
is used (28): 
(1+r) (1+k) =   
   (3) 
 
The Ziobrowski (1997) model assumes that a timeshare purchase is relatively risk free and 
thus applies a risk free rate of return of 5% annually, stating “It is our assumption that most 
timeshare purchasers view the acquisition as an essentially risk-free way of reducing vacation 
expenses in the future, not as a money-making venture” Ziobrowski (1997). The use of a “risk-free” 
rate is contestable as there are numerous risks in timeshare investment, as outlined above, which 
should be factored into any analysis. Furthermore, there are various investment opportunities which 
enable an investor to gain higher returns than the risk-free rate, which are assumed have similar risk 
profiles. The benchmark regarded as being a reasonable proxy for timeshare investment is a 
property trust index. It is considered that property trusts, as a managed investment product as is 
timeshare, would serve as a reasonable proxy for timeshare investment. In the Australian market the 
S&P/ASX 300 Property Trusts - Price Index from the Australian Stock Exchange was selected. 
Datastream has data from 31 March 2000. The return based on the 2.27 years from 31 March 2000 
to 9 July 2002, when this data was accessed, is 8.03% (29). This is applied as the discount rate in 
this analysis. Once again, it is assumed that the investment is not funded with borrowings, in which 
case, the cost of debt should also be factored in. 
Another distinction to the Ziobrowski (1997) approach is that resale proceeds will be 
evaluated at a 75.4% as well as 50% discount of the original purchase price. This is considered to be 
inline with typical resale values in the region and is more representative of resale values, plus it 
factors in brokerage and transaction (6, 26). A holding period of ten years is assumed by 
Ziobrowski (1997) “based on the belief that after vacationing in the same place for ten years, the 
purchaser may want a change.” Ten years is probably a reasonable timeline, though the analysis 
conducted in this paper also applies a longer horizon.  
The analysis is rerun based on the economic conditions in Australia in July 2002, where 
inflation had averaged 2.4% in the ten years from July 1992 (data source: Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2002 (30)). Thus, applying a required rate return of 8.03% to the previous scenario of an 
initial cash outlay of AUD19,500 per timeshare unit, an annual maintenance fee of AUD440 and the 
rent for similar holiday unit of AUD1,365 as the economic benefit. With inflation set at 2.4% and a 
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nominal required rate of return of 8.03% the real required rate of return is 5.5%. The NPV analysis 
is rerun using formula (1) and a recalculation is made. The results of this analysis show that NPV is 
negative at a generally unacceptable level for the case presented (see Table 2 and Figure 4). 
Table 2: NPV results at 8.03% 
Initial cash outlay = AUD19,500 
Year  
PV of resale 
proceeds at 
75.4% depreciation NPV 
PV of resale 
proceeds at 
50% depreciation NPV 
10  $2,809 -$8,996 $5,709 -$6,095 
20  $1,645 -$4,448 $3,343 -$2,750 
30  $963 -$890 $1,957 $105 
33  $820 $12   
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Figure 4: NPV results at 8.03% 
 
If the purchaser were able to resell at a 50% discount to the purchase price, NPV does not 
attain positive figures until the 30th year (see Table 2 and Figure 4). At a resale price of 75.4%, 
NPV becomes positive in the 33rd year. These are very long horizons, and thus based on the ten-
year horizon, the investment would be soundly rejected. The present value of the benefits gained 
from the purchase are less than the initial outlay, meaning that it is more cost effective to simply 
rent a holiday unit year by year in the resort in this case. 
Using this same required rate of return, another example of a timeshare offer is briefly 
considered. In this case the initial cash outlay per timeshare unit is AUD16,850, the annual 
maintenance fee is AUD385, and the rent for a similar mid-season unit is AUD1,155. The results 
are presented in Table 3.  
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Table 3: NPV results of second example at 8.03% 
Initial cash outlay = AUD16,850 
Year  
PV of resale 
proceeds at 
75.4% depreciation NPV 
PV of resale 
proceeds at 
50% depreciation NPV 
10  $2,427 -$8,017 $4,933 -$5,511 
20  $1,421 -$4,268 $2,889 -$2,801 
30  $832 -$1,328 $1,691 -$468 
33  $709 -$582 $1,440 $150 
36  $604 $108   
 
In this example, though the initial outlay and annual maintenance fees are less, NPV analysis 
still does not show any improvement. At 50 % NPV does not enter positive territory until the 33rd 
year and at 75.4% the 36th year. Accordingly, the investment would be soundly rejected based on 
the ten-year horizon. Indeed, although the initial outlay and maintenance fess are less, this is 
demonstrated to be less cost effective as the benefit gained is proportionally less. 
The conclusion therefore, based on this analysis, and these particular representative cases, is 
that, given a ten-year horizon, this investment would be rejected. Though the discount rate ranged 
from 5% to 8.03%, each analysis had a negative NPV after ten years. The discount rate of 8.03% is 
the more accurate rate of the two as it incorporates some risk and is based on a reasonable proxy of 
timeshare returns. The timeline was in excess of 30 years before a positive NPV was reached. Thus, 
an investor is quite likely to find a better investment than these in the market place, if well judged 
investment choices are made.  
Ramifications for the timeshare industry 
The timeshare industry strenuously defends its position that timeshare is an investment in 
lifestyle, rather than an investment for return. The argument that consumers should have choice, and 
that a consumer’s choice does not always meet standards of return that an economic analysis may 
present, is reasonable. Consumer’s utility may be met in many ways. Consumer spending may very 
well fit within models aligned with consumer behaviour, marketing or other disciplines rather than 
an economic analysis. So if timeshare is marketed as a purely consumer product and is purchased 
for the utility and pleasure of the consumer that can readily afford to make such an expenditure, 
then that is probably quite acceptable. The industry is focussing on the vacation ownership product 
that reflects this view. A survey of timeshare owners conducted by Yankelovich Partners in 1999, 
found that 87% of timeshare purchasers are satisfied and, of current owners, 45% are very 
interested in purchasing extra timeshare in the future (1, 5). This indicates that consumers are 
relatively happy with their purchase.  
 21 
However, it is difficult to support the notion often purported in promoting timeshare as 
locking in the future price of a vocation through the payment of an upfront fee or premium today. 
Putting the notion of a security aside, it should still be able to be demonstrated that it is a viable 
purchase. Over a reasonable time horizon, the analysis outlined above in which NPV was negative 
in all cases refutes this claim, at least in the cases examined. 
What can the industry do to make timeshare a more viable investment alternative from the 
consumers’ perspective? One of the primary reasons that returns are not being realised is that many 
of the initial costs are high. To some extent this is to be expected as the costs involved in fractional 
ownership of any asset is expected to be higher as the economies of scale decrease and the per unit 
costs increase. Development costs are very high. These include feasibility studies, environmental 
studies, various consulting and planning fees, project management, construction, financing, 
regulatory compliance costs and marketing, to name a few. In addition, financiers assume 
substantial risk and require a return on their investment that will reward them for the level of risk 
for financing purchases of vacation weeks at the resorts. Also the developer bears considerable risk 
and of course wishes to be compensated for the risk involved. The returns on the investment must 
be sufficient to compensate both the developer and the financiers. Thus and decrease in costs will 
assist in making timeshare more viable. 
The purchase price is inflated by the cost of sales. A breakdown of the timeshare price of 
AUD19,500 per-unit-week used in the above analysis is conducted, given the current per-unit-week 
property value of AUD6,788, mentioned above. The breakdown reveals that the total cost of sales, 
other expenses and profit margin amounts to AUD12,712 per-unit-week or a total of 65%. If the 
cost of sales were 40% (5, 6), it would amount to AUD7,800 per-unit-week. Thus the financing and 
administration costs and profit margin would be approximately AUD4,912 or 25%. This then 
explains the difference between the per unit current market value of AUD353,000 and the timeshare 
price of AUD1,014,000, which includes the cost of sales, other expenses and margin. Likewise, 
marketing any real estate does have similar expenses, however generally the cost of sales appears 
higher in the timeshare industry. High marketing costs are exacerbated with variations in legislation 
across countries and even states, which reduces the potential for mass marketing through mass 
media or e-commerce. 
If the cost of sales and other expenses were able to be reduced it would make purchasing a 
timeshare unit a more viable option. However, to some extent it is a no-win situation. If the cost of 
sales were to be reduced, making the purchasing price more attractive, marketing would be reduced 
and potentially less people would be attracted to the purchase. The investment for developers would 
then be less viable, as it would likely take longer to sell all the weeks, which in turn would increase 
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financing and marketing costs. However, this may be mitigated to some extent in that more buyers 
could be attracted to the purchase of timeshare products because it is more viable for the discerning 
consumer.  
Furthermore, the annual maintenance fee is generally quite high. These fees are able to be 
sustained at a high level as the exit costs are high due to poor resale prices. Furthermore, typically 
they are compared with the cost of renting a similar unit for one week. As can be seen in Table 4, 
maintenance fees are made up of both building maintenance and service to members. To reduce the 
maintenance fee, perhaps the service provision side of the fee could be separated from the actual 
maintenance costs. This could have two primary advantages. Firstly, the most obvious is that it 
would make timeshare more affordable and thus a better investment opportunity both as a lifestyle 
choose and as a more viable project. Secondly, service provision could then be based on a user pay 
basis. Those who desire a high level of service then pay for the level of service required rather than 
all members subsidising this high level of service. 
Table 4: Typical Expenses Included in Maintenance Fees 
Accounting & auditing fees Local Authority charges levies & rates 
Activities provision Loss prevention 
Administration Management fees 
Building maintenance Other contingencies 
Cable television  Pest control 
Cleaning – general Pool & spa heating 
Cleaning fees Pool & spa maintenance 
Directors & other management expenses Postage, printing, & handling 
Electricity Professional fees 
Elevator expense Reservations & front desk 
Entertainment facilities Reserve for replacement fund 
Furniture & chattels replacement/ 
maintenance 
Resort fees 
Grounds & landscaping maintenance Taxes – state & federal 
Housekeeping services Telephone 
Insurances Tennis court maintenance 
Internet fees Waste collection 
Inventory replacement Water & sewerage 
Adapted from: Ziobrowski and Ziobrowski, 1997. (3) 
 
Therefore a significant matter that the industry as a whole may consider that impacts on the 
marketing of this service is to work at reducing the cost of sales and increasing resale values. All 
expenses incurred that are passed on in the purchase price have a bearing on this. More efficient 
marketing for example could reduce the purchase price and make timeshare not only more 
affordable, but a more viable consumer investment. If annual maintenance fees could be reduced, it 
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would make the product more viable to discerning purchasers. A more saleable product will 
increase sales and thus reduce the risk and costs that the developer of the timeshare resorts bears as 
well. A further consideration for the industry would be to look at reducing the cost of exiting a 
timeshare investment. This would reduce liquidity and marketability risk, which would also tend to 
make the purchase more viable and increase sales. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper the question is addressed asking, “Is Timeshare Ownership an Investment 
Product?” The conclusion is that there is an outlay of funds by the purchaser for economic benefit, 
thus it fits well within the definition of an investment product.  The paper adds to the literature in 
that it advances the discussion regarding where timeshare fits as an industry, the risks associated 
with timeshare and the methodology applied in timeshare valuation. An analysis is conducted 
considering the viability of investing in timeshare versus that of simply renting a holiday unit for 
one week per year. The example used in this case is based on representative real figures taken from 
an offer made on a particular timeshare property from a popular timeshare location and tourist 
destination. The model proposed in this study applies a theoretically sound discount rate and more 
realistic assumptions and resale values then do prior studies. 
As investment is based on the notion of risk and return, firstly the risks associated with 
timeshare are discussed. Following, an analysis is conducted using two required returns levels. It is 
found that, in the examples studied, when considering the risks and thus the return that would be 
expected by a discerning investor, the analysis does not support the proposition that these timeshare 
investments provide reasonable returns to the consumer. The scenario that a capital gain could make 
up the shortfall was considered, but it was demonstrated that this was not probable in the cases 
presented. 
The notion, as is often proposed by timeshare sales personnel, that the purchase of timeshare 
can lock-in at least a portion of vocation expenses to today’s rates by the investment of an upfront 
fee, was also investigated. The notion is not supported by the analysis and does not prove to be 
viable in the cases analysed.  
Based on the examples discussed, there are three aspects highlighted in the paper as 
contributing to the costs of ownership of timeshare that are considered as factors that could be 
addressed to make timeshare ownership more feasible. They are the cost of sales, maintenance costs 
and exit costs. If the industry were able to take up the challenge of reducing these costs in 
particular, it is likely that investment in timeshare would be more viable and attract a wider market. 
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As this study is conducted based on just two examples, further study is required on a much 
wider scale before any conclusions can be drawn for timeshare investment as a whole. However, 
this study does provide a basis for further research. Additional research could evaluate a larger data 
set of timeshare properties, in different markets, over varying timeframes. Further discussion would 
be valuable as to reducing costs associated with the sale and administration of timeshare.  
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